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ABSTRACT    
The purpose of this article is to investigate the effect of overvalued equity on the relationship 
between audit quality and earning quality. In this article audit firm size, auditor industry specialization 
and auditor tenure were used as audit quality variable. The sample population consists of 189 
companies listed in Tehran stock Exchange during the period 2008 to 2012. To test the hypotheses, 
OLS in Eviews has been used and investigation method of data is panel. The results show a reverse 
relationship between all audit quality variables and absolute discretionary accruals indicating that high 
audit quality causes higher earning quality. But the existence of overvalued equity cause decreasing or 
reversing of these relationships, in other words, when a firm is highly valued the accruals’ decreasing 
effect of high quality auditors is reduced. 
 
Keywords: Audit quality; Earing quality, Price earnings ratio; Highly valued equity; Discretionary 
accruals 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Accounting profit which provides using accrual system, from the perspective of many 
users of financial statements, is a tool for measuring the performance of company. On the 
other hand, Accounting regulations allow managers to affect financial reports by selecting 
accepted procedures. This policy helps manage reported earnings and better reflect firms' 
economic position. Selecting policies to transfer present expenses to future expenses and 
forthcoming revenues to present revenues have been gathered together, which makes it 
difficult to attain objectives in the future periods. The finance literature has widely 
documented that overvaluation intensifies income-increasing earning's management 
activities. Jensen (2005) argues, also, that when a firm becomes overvalued, i.e. the price of 
the firm becomes greater than its underlying economic value; managers are motivated to 
perpetuate overvaluation, which is consistent in principle with arguments in Renas and 
Cebula (2005). Although numerous reporting alternatives are available to achieve earnings 
management goals, accruals are an especially attractive choice since they are a normal part of 
the financial reporting process and their amounts require forward looking estimates over 
which managers have considerable discretion. Audit quality studies document that accruals 
decrease when the audit firm is large, or the audit firm is an industry specialist, or the audit-
client tenure is long. The purpose of this paper is to posit that incentives related to highly-
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valued equity mitigate these results, as managers use income increasing accruals to augment 
earnings. 
 
  
2. LITERATURE AND THEORY 
 
2.1. Highly valued equity 
 
Beginning with Jensen (2005), a significant stream of research has developed regarding 
the overvalued equity hypothesis. Houmes et al. (2013) suggest that when a firm is highly 
valued the accruals’ decreasing effect of high quality auditors is reduced. 
Jie Chen (2007) examines the relationship between discretionary accruals and returns 
from the prior year or after the year of the stock market. The results indicate that managers 
tend, in the face of higher abnormal returns, to support equity overvaluation through 
increasing earnings management. Anderson and Brooks (2006) document that the difference 
in returns between value and glamour firms almost doubles when P/Es are calculated using 
average earnings over the last eight years. Hence, from a market value perspective and 
relative to other companies, the very firms that are expected to perform the best, on average, 
tend to perform worse. Since expectations are particularly high for highly valued firms, when 
managers foresee the operational inability of their firms to meet expected performance 
targets, incentives to manage earnings increase. An important deterrent against these 
incentives is the audit. 
Researchers conclude that when managers face material abnormal returns, they tend to 
support overvalued equity through income-increasing earning management (Badertscher, 
2010; Chi & Gupta, 2009; Jie Chen, 2007; Graham et al., 2005). Higher discretionary 
accruals are associated with lower future abnormal stock returns, and more importantly, this 
association becomes stronger as prior overvaluation intensifies. Among the most overvalued 
firms, those with high discretionary accruals underperform those with low discretionary 
accruals during the following year (Chi and Gupta, 2009). 
 
2.2. Audit quality  
 
Chen et al., (2005) in their study tested the relationship between audit quality and 
earnings management for Taiwanese companies that offer their shares in stock for the first 
time. They use from proficiency of auditor in the industry and firm size as audit quality and 
abnormal accruals calculated using the modified Jones model as earnings management. The 
results showed that the Big Five audit firms will reduce earnings management. In other 
words, high quality of auditors limits earnings management of Taiwanese companies. Becker 
(1998) in their study found that there is positive and significant relationship between low 
audit quality and discretionary accruals. Memis and Cetenak (2012) in their study 
investigated the effect of audit quality on earnings management. Researchers used from the 
audit firm size as an indicator to measure audit quality. The results showed that there is no 
significant relationship between audit quality and earnings management. Test results of 
control variables showed that there is negative and significant relationship between firm size 
and return on assets with earnings management. But it was not observed positive and 
significant relationship between financial leverage and discretionary accruals. Zgarni (2012) 
in their study studied the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The 
results indicate that there is significant and negative relationship between the variables of 
auditor proficiency in industry and auditor size with earnings management. But it was not 
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observed significant relationship between auditor tenure period and earnings management. 
Davis et al. (2000) in their study concluded that there is negative and significant relationship 
between audit quality and earnings management. In addition, in a study which performed by 
Azibi and Rajhi (2008) and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), found that audit firm size has no 
effect on the reduction of discretionary accruals. The value of accounting information is a 
function of its credibility, and a central objective of audits is to enhance the quality of 
financial reporting. Prior studies have provided several empirical surrogates to measure audit 
quality. These include audit firm size, audit industry specialization, and the length of the 
auditor-client relationship. 
Beginning with DeAngelo (1981), decades of research have shown that large audit 
firms with greater resources and more reputation at stake perform higher quality audits 
(Beatty, 1989; Houmes et al., 2012, etc). Houmes and Skantz (2010) provide evidence that 
the magnitude of the inverse relation between operating cash flow and accruals increases if 
the firm is highly valued and assert that incentives to manage earnings increase when 
operating cash flow is weak. Although they do not offer any direct tests relating to the effect 
of high valuation on audit quality after excluding loss firms, they find (not tabulated) 
evidence large Big N auditors reduce this tendency. Mansi et al. (2004) show that the cost of 
debt decreases with tenure and Carcello and Nagy (2004) document an increase in the 
incidence of financial reporting fraud when audit firm tenure is less than three years. 
Although audit opinions enhance the credibility and reliability of financial reports, they 
also reflect a negotiation dimension and, within the ethical and technical confines of 
accounting standards, a firm’s published financial report may be perceived as a joint 
statement from the manager and auditor (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991). 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Participants 
 
Statistical population of this study includes all the listed companies in Tehran Stock 
Exchange. Sampling method also is systematic elimination method; therefore, companies that 
have the following conditions were selected for the period 2008-2012.  
1. These companies are listed in Tehran Stock Exchange before the year 2008.  
2. In order to increase comparability, the end of their fiscal year leads up to December 31.  
3. In order to information homogeneity, companies should be manufacturing and are not 
investing and financing companies.  
4. Their financial period has not changed during the studied period. 
By applying these restrictions, 189 companies during the period 2008-2012 were 
selected. 
 
3.2. Data analysis 
 
The present study is application type based on the purpose to do it and is descriptive-
correlation based on the nature and method. The statistical model used in this study is a 
multivariate regression model. To estimate the research model panel data model is used. In 
this method, time series and cross-sectional data are combined with each other and are used 
for those problems that cannot be investigated as a time series or cross-sectional. To estimate 
the efficiency of a regression model using panel data, it is necessary that using appropriate 
tests is selected one of the common effects, fixed effects and random effects models. 
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Therefore, first to select between the common effects and fixed effects models are used F-
Limer test. If a fixed effect model is selected, the Hausman test is performed to choose 
between fixed effects and random-effects models. In this study, to investigate the 
independence of the errors of the regression model is used Durbin-Watson test (DW) and to 
accept or reject the main hypothesis of the research is used the t-student statistic and also the 
main hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
H1. The inverse relation between the discretionary accruals of the clients of large audit 
firms and the discretionary accruals of the clients of other audit firms changes if the clients 
are highly valued. 
H2. The inverse relation between the discretionary accruals of the clients of industry 
specialist audit firms and the discretionary accruals of the clients of other audit firms changes 
if the clients are highly valued. 
H3. The inverse relation between the discretionary accruals of audit firms’ clients with 
long tenure and the discretionary accruals of clients with shorter tenure changes if the clients 
are highly valued. 
H4. The inverse relation between the discretionary accruals of the clients of audit 
industry specialist audit firms with long tenure and the discretionary accruals of other clients 
changes if the clients are highly valued. 
 
3.3. Discretionary accruals 
 
Our dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DACit). For all firms, discretionary 
accruals are estimated using the cross sectional version of the modified Jones model (Jones, 
1991). The modified Jones model has been used in a variety of research settings (Becker et 
al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Reynolds and Francis, 2000, etc.). The model is specified as 
follows: 
 
 
TACit/ TAit-1 =β0+β1 (1/TAit-1) + β2 (Δ REV- Δ AR) / TAit-1 + β3 PPEit/ TAit-1 +εit 
 
 Where TACit is the difference between firm i’s year t earnings before extraordinary 
items and net cash flow from operations scaled by beginning of year (t-1) assets; ATit-1 is firm 
i’s beginning of the year t total assets; Δ REVit is the difference in year t and year t-1 sales; Δ 
ARit is the difference between year t and year t-1 trade account receivables; and PPEit is net 
property plant and equipment both scaled by ATit-1. Discretionary accruals are the difference 
between each firm’s actual and predicted accruals, i.e.: 
 
DACit = TACit  – [β0+β1 (1 / TAit-1) + β2 (Δ REVit- Δ ARit) / TAit-1 + β3PPEit] 
 
In our models we include controls that may affect the cross sectional variability in the 
dependent variable, DACit. 
 
 
3.4. Control variables 
 
Relative to other companies, certain industries or firms may tend to generate higher 
accruals. In addition, it is natural that growth companies with increasing earnings and 
investments in working capital are more likely to produce greater accruals, and prior studies 
show that growth firms report higher accruals (McNichols, 2000). To control for the 
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possibility that companies with greater total accruals may also have larger discretionary 
accruals that our accruals model does not capture, we include total accruals (ACRLit) in our 
multivariate tests measured as the difference between firm i’s year t earnings before 
extraordinary items and net cash flow from operations scaled by beginning of year assets. 
Accruals studies typically control for size effects. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that 
larger firms record larger accruals. Also, larger firms with larger investor following and more 
developed and sophisticated financial reporting systems may affect accrual levels (Becker et 
al., 1998; Reynolds and Francis, 2000). For each firm i we include the end of fiscal year t 
natural log of total assets (LnASSETit). Reynolds and Francis (2000) provide evidence that 
the tendency to manage earnings increases with leverage. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
show that accruals are related to debt covenant breeches. In addition, debt may serve as a 
monitoring mechanism that constrains earnings management. To control for the effect that 
high debt levels may have on accruals, we include the variable LEVit measured as firm i’s 
end of year t long term debt scaled by t-1 total assets. 
Operating cash flows are a component of earnings and their levels correspond inversely 
with accruals. Further, the level of cash flow may affect the ability and/or need to use 
accruals, causing firms with higher (lower) operating cash flows to report lower (higher) 
discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998). We control for these effects by including 
operating cash flow deflated by the beginning of the year total assets (OCFit). Kothari et al. 
(2005) show that discretionary accruals are impacted by financial performance. Accordingly, 
we include ROAit, income before extraordinary items divided by the beginning of the year 
total assets. Similar to our dependent variable, DACit (Houmes, 2013). 
 
3.5. Audit quality and highly valued equity 
 
We identify highly valued clients (HVit-1) as firms in the highest quintile of PEs (i.e. 
P/E> 28. 07) and assign an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is in this quintile of prior 
fiscal year end price-to-earnings ratios and 0 otherwise. 
Our audit quality variables are as follows: big audit firm (BIGit-1), industry specialist 
audit firm (SPECit-1), the audit-client tenure (TENit-1) and an indicator variable if the auditor 
is both an industry specialist and has a long tenure auditor-client relationship (SPECTENit-1). 
To investigate the relation between high valuations and the tendency of high audit 
quality auditors to mitigate accruals, we interact the audit quality variables with our highly 
valued equity dummy. Statistically significantly positive estimates for the audit quality, 
highly valued equity interaction terms: BIGN *HVit-1, SPEC *HVit-1, TEN *HVit-1 and 
SPECTEN *HVit-1, provide support for hypotheses that incentives associated with high 
valuations reduce the tendency of high quality audit firms to constrain accruals. Our models 
are as follows: 
 
DACit = α0 + α1ΑCRLit + α2LnΑSSETit + α3LEVit +α4OCFit + α5 ROΑit +α6BIGNit-1 + 
α7HVit-1 + α8BIGN *HVit-1 + εit 
 
DACit= α0 + α1ΑCRLit + α2LnΑSSETit + α3LEVit +α4OCFit + α5ROΑit+ α6SPECit-1 + 
α7HVit-1 + α8SPEC *HVit-1 + εit 
 
DACit= α0 + α1ΑCRLit + α2LnΑSSETit + α3LEVit + α4OCFit + α5ROΑit+ α6TENit-1 + α7HVit-1 
+ α8 TEN *HVit-1 + εit 
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DACit= α0+ α1ΑCRLit + α2LnΑSSETit+ α3LEVit+α4OCFit + α5ROΑit+ α6SPECTENit-1+ 
α7HVit-1 +α8SPECTEN*HVit-1 + εit 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions. 
 
Variables definition 
DACit Firm i’s fiscal year t absolute value of discretionary accruals 
ACRLit Firm i’s fiscal year t total accruals 
LnASSETit Firm i’s fiscal year t natural log of total assets 
LEVit Firm i’s fiscal year t long term debt divided by fiscal year t-1 total assets 
OCFit Firm i’s fiscal year t cash flow from operating activates divided by fiscal year t-1 
total assets 
ROAit Firm i’s fiscal year t income before extraordinary items divided by fiscal year t-1 
total assets 
HVit-1 An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in the highest quintile of fiscal year t-1 
price-to-earnings ratios 
AQ it-1 Four measures of audit quality defined as follows 
BIGit-1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if at the end of fiscal year t-1 the auditor is 
Auditing Organization of Iran 
SPECit-1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if at the end of fiscal year t-1 the auditor is an 
industry specialist 
TENit-1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if at the end of fiscal year t-1 the auditor tenure is 
greater than or equal to four years 
SPECTENit-1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if at the end of fiscal year t-1 the auditor is an 
industry specialist and tenure is greater than or equal to five years 
BIG *HVit-1 An interaction term between BIGNit-1 and HVit-1 
SPEC *HVit-1 An interaction term between SPECit-1 and HVit-1 
TEN *HVit-1 An interaction term between TENit-1 and HVit-1 
SPECTEN *HVit-1 An interaction term between SPECTENit-1 and HVit-1 
 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of the main research variables are presented in Table (2). As can 
be seen, the average absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DACC|) is equal to 0.14 and 
suggests that the studied companies on average have 14% of the discretionary accruals which 
its range is between 0 and 2.22. The average of financial leverage (LEV) is equal to 0.10 and 
indicates that on average 10% of the required funds of studied companies are provided from 
the debt. Also, the average of return on assets (ROA) indicates that on average 16% of the net 
profits of companies are acquired from applying corporate assets. The average of big audit 
organization (BIG) is equal to 0.22 which shows that 22% of the financial statements of 
studied companies have been investigated by large audit firms (Iran Audit Organization). The 
average of industry specialist auditor (SPEC) is equal to 0.42 which shows that 42% of the 
financial statements of studied companies have been investigated by industry specialist 
auditors. The average of auditor tenure (TEN) is equal to 0.53 suggesting that 53% of the 
companies were investigated by the same auditor for 4 years. The results also show that 31% 
of the observations involve specialist and long tenure audit client and 20% have over-valued 
equity. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
DACit 0.14 0.1 2.22 0 0.18 
ACRLit 0.11 0.08 1.08 0 0.11 
LnASSETit 13.45 13.26 18.55 10.03 1.46 
LEVit 0.10 0.06 1.56 0 0.13 
OCFit 0.14 0.11 1.12 -0.50 0.16 
ROAit 0.16 0.11 2.82 -0.37 0.27 
BIGit 0.22 0 1 0 0.41 
SPECit 0.42 1 1 0 0.45 
TENit 0.53 0 1 0 0.50 
SPECTENit 0.31 0 1 0 0.42 
HVit 0.20 0 1 0 0.40 
 
 
4.2. Correlations 
 
Table 3 provides correlations. Correlations in Table 3 reveal that size, leverage and 
operating are inversely related to discretionary and total accruals, cash flow and ROA are 
positively related to total absolute value of discretionary accruals. All control variables 
except for size are also positively correlated with our HVit-1 indicator variable. While 
coefficients are negative between each of our audit quality variables and HVit-1.  
 
Table 3. Correlations. 
 
 
 
4.3. F-Limer & Huasman test 
 
To determine the appropriate method for estimating the model, first F-Limer test is 
performed to determine whether the data are pool or panel, also Hausman test is performed to 
select one of the fixed effects and random effects methods. As can be seen from the results of 
Table (4), P-value of F-Limer test is equal to 0.000 and is less than 1% error level. Thus, the 
data are panel. Consequently, the Hausman test is performed to select one of the fixed effects 
 DA ACRL ASSET LEVIT OCFIT ROA BIG SPE TEN SPETEN HV 
DA 1 0.26 -0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.60 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 -0.002 0.06 
ACRL 0.26 1 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.03 
ASSET -0.03 0.04 1 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.20 0.30 0.08 0.08 -0.05 
LEVIT -0.03 -0.04 0.00 1 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 
OCFIT 0.14 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 1 0.47 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.00 
ROA 0.60 0.11 0.04 -0.13 0.47 1 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.03 
BIG -0.03 0.03 0.20 -0.06 0.05 0.04 1 0.23 0.37 0.26 -0.07 
SPE -0.10 0.03 0.30 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.23 1 0.20 0.14 -0.02 
TEN -0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.37 0.20 1 0.57 -0.09 
SPETEN -0.002 0.18 0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.12 0.26 0.14 0.57 1 -0.07 
HV 0.06 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 1 
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and random effects methods. As can be seen from the results of Table (5), P-value of 
Hausman test is equal to 0.000 and is less than 5% error level. Thus, the results show that the 
fixed effects method is most appropriate method for estimating regression model of research. 
 
Table 4. F-limer test. 
 
Model Statistic Prob. Test result 
H1   (BIG) 4.46 0.00000 Panel data 
H2   (SPEC) 4.37 0.00000 Panel data 
H3   (TEN) 4.43 0.00000 Panel data 
H4   (SPECTEN) 4.41 0.00000 Panel data 
 
 
Table 5. Hausman test. 
 
Model Statistic Prob. Test result 
H1   (BIG) 65.65 0.00000 Fixed effects method 
H2   (SPEC) 66.53 0.00000 Fixed effects method 
H3   (TEN) 64.98 0.00000 Fixed effects method 
H4   (SPECTEN) 65.04 0.00000 Fixed effects method 
 
 
4.4. The regression results 
 
Table 6 shows results of main tests for our income increasing discretionary accruals 
sample for models depicted in equations. Adjusted R2 exceeds 70 percent, indicating that 
explanatory variables of model explain more than 70 percent of changes in the earnings 
management (the dependent variable). The F-statistic values are more than 10 and its P-
values are 0.000, indicating that the models are significant in general. Also, Durbin-Watson 
statistic values are all between 1.5 and 2.5 stating that there is no autocorrelation problem 
between research variables. Total accrual (ACRLit) is significant and positive. As expected 
and in accordance with prior accruals studies, estimates for assets and operating cash flow are 
negative, suggesting that greater firm size and operating cash flow enhance accruals quality. 
The coefficients for ROAit are positive. Discretionary accruals increase with (scaled) income. 
HVit-1 is positive. The coefficients for the Big, specialist, and long tenure-specialist audit 
quality measures are negative. However, the estimate for our audit quality variable, TENit, is 
insignificant. We test hypotheses with interaction terms between our highly valued equity and 
audit quality variables: BIGN *HVit-1, SPEC *HVit-1, TEN *HVit-1 and SPECTEN *HVit-1. 
For each of the four alternative audit quality measures, discretionary accruals increase when 
the client firm is highly valued.  
 
 
Table 6. Regression results. 
 
 BIG 
coefficient 
( p-value) 
SPEC 
coefficient 
( p-value) 
TEN 
coefficient 
( p-value) 
SPECTEN 
coefficient 
( p-value) 
ACRLit 0.297(0.000) 0.270(0.000) 0.295(0.000) 0.324(0.000) 
LnASSETit -0.005(0.053) -0.027(0.055) -0.006(0.042) -0.005(0.086) 
LEVit 0.076 (0.035) 0.088(0.0142) 0.081(0.024) 0.075(0.035) 
OCFit -0.186 (0.000) -0.183(0.000) -0.188(0.000) -0.204(0.000) 
ROAit 0.453 (0.000) 0.452(0.000) 0.453(0.000) 0.465(0.000) 
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HVit 0.008(0.085) 0.026(0.094) 0.011(0.084) 0.009(0.063) 
BIGit -0.023(0.050)    
BIG *HVit-1 0.027(0.070)    
SPECit  -0.035(0.001)   
SPEC *HVit-1  -0.017(0.054)   
TENit   -0.001(0.467)  
TEN *HVit-1   0.007(0.07)  
SPECTENit    -0.052(0.000) 
SPECTEN * 
HVit-1 
   0.009(0.045) 
Adjusted R2 0.732 0.733 0.731 0.736 
F-statistic 10.458 10.48 10.37 10.65 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 2.00 1.99 2.01 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study we examined the accruals decreasing effect of high quality auditors on 
highly valued audit clients. For achieving this aim, the discretionary accruals as criteria for 
earning management was determined by using the modified-Jones model and audit firm size, 
auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure were used as audit quality variable. Also 
overvalued equity variable was used as an independent variable and an indicator with audit 
quality variables. The results show that management incentives associated with highly valued 
equity reduce the tendency of high quality auditors to reduce accruals. In specific, a negative 
relationship was shown between audit quality variable and absolute discretionary accruals 
which all were significant except for auditor tenure, suggesting that absolute discretionary 
accruals decrease when audit quality is high but the negative relationship is inversed or 
reduced when the company’s equity is overvalued. The only audit quality variable which 
keeps its negative effect is auditor industry specialization suggesting that this variable is the 
most effective audit quality variable. Also, the test results of control variables of research 
indicate that there is significant and positive relationship between the variables of total 
accrual, financial leverage (LEV) and return on assets (ROA), with earnings management and 
a significant negative relationship between the variables of firm size (LnASSET) and cash 
flow with discretionary accruals. 
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